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1Rational ignorance in long-run risk models
Abstract
We document an unpleasant feature of Epstein-Zin preferences in a stylized
model economy of the long-run risk type now widespread in Asset Pricing: Agents
with preference parameters commonly described as indicating a “preference for
early resolution of uncertainty” achieve higher utility levels if they can commit
to ignoring information on the state of the business cycle. For parameter choices
similar to those used to explain asset prices, an agent can achieve utility gains
equivalent to a more than 40 % increase in life-time consumption by committing
to ignore information on the trend growth rate of the endowment good. We show
that opting for such a coarser information set can be implemented and supported
as an equilibrium strategy.
Keywords: Recursive preferences; Epstein-Zin preferences; Uncertainty aversion; Infor-
mation processing; Time inconsistency
JEL: D83, D84, E32
1The separation of the preference parameters governing the elasticity of intertempo-
ral substitution and relative risk aversion permitted by the Epstein-Zin utility function
(Epstein and Zin, 1989; Weil, 1989) has proven very fruitful in the asset pricing litera-
ture. Recent successful asset pricing models rely on calibrations of the utility function
where the representative agent has both a high level of risk aversion and a high elas-
ticity of intertemporal substitution. To name a few, Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004)
use such a calibration to explain stock market anomalies, Piazzesi and Schneider (2007)
use such a calibration to explain the average shape of the yield curve, and Lettau et
al. (2008) use such a calibration to explain the run up in stock prices during the late
nineties. In a seminal paper Bansal and Yaron (2004) forcefully demonstrate that in
an exchange economy with a long run risk component in consumption, that is when
the growth rate of the endowment good follows a trend stationary process with low
conditional volatility but high unconditional volatility, such utility speciﬁcations pro-
duce both a low risk free rate and a plausible risk premium for equity. Their paper has
spawned a large body of research which we will refer to as the long-run risk literature.1
In this paper we go through the following thought experiment: We place an agent
with Epstein-Zin preferences in a stylized endowment economy of the type analyzed in
the long-run risk literature and give her the option not to incorporate any type of news
when forming posterior beliefs about the current state of the trend consumption growth
rate. If she chooses to do so, her information set includes all the hyper-parameters of
the economy and her current consumption level, but does not include any information
that would help her determine the current level of the stochastic trend growth rate of
1With no pretension of a complete list: Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2008) and Croce (2008)
show how a predictable component to consumption growth rates can arise in production economies.
Colacito and Croce (2008) and Bansal and Shaliastovich (2009) study international linkages in open
economies when each country has a small predictable component in its consumption growth rate trend.
Hasseltoft (2008), Doh (2008), and Wu (2008) look at interest rate implications of long-run risk models.
Constantinides and Ghosh (2008) and Rangvid et al. (2009) provides explicit estimation of long run
risk models. Bansal et al. (2007) and Cederburg and Hore (2008) analyzes the extent to which a
long-run risk model can explain the predictability in the cross-secional data on security returns.
2the endowment good. We assume that her preference parameters are the same as those
of the representative agent of the economy. Knowing that her information is coarser
than that of other agents she does not trade actively in a way that can be exploited by
more informed agents. She keeps all her assets in the market portfolio and consumes
the same as the representative agent. That is, she holds only claims to the Lucas tree
and consumes its fruit every period. The consumption proﬁle of this agent will mirror
that of the representative agent in the economy. The only way the coarser information
set she uses inﬂuences her utility level is through the timing of information about future
consumption.
We ﬁnd that, for model parameters similar to those used in the asset pricing litera-
ture, the continuation value for the coarser information set is much higher than for an
agent whose information set also includes the current trend growth level of consump-
tion. For a calibration that draws on Bansal and Yaron (2004), we ﬁnd utility gains
from committing to using a coarser information set equivalent to a 40 % increase in
lifetime consumption.
To us, the numbers we ﬁnd are not only surprising in their magnitude but also
in their direction. The parameterization we look at are such that the agent would be
classiﬁed as having preference for early resolution of uncertainty according to a common
taxonomy. (See e.g. Kocherlakota, 1990 or Skiadas, 1998.) The presumed plausibility
of utility functions generating a preference for early resolution of uncertainty seems to
lend credence to Epstein-Zin preferences.2 The concept is illustrated in Figure 1 which
2It is important to keep in mind that we are discussing early resolution of uncertainty about
consumption itself. The seminal article by Kreps and Porteus (1978) motivates the preference for
early resolution over lotteries by stating that it is natural to prefer to know your income earlier
so that you can better budget it for consumption purposes. In the endowment economy we are
considering, equilibrium consumption of the representative agent is always going to be equal to the
endowment stream, so early resolution of uncertainty cannot provide any means for better budgeting
since consumption is unaﬀected by it. Any preference for resolution of uncertainty in such economies
must come directly from the way the distribution of possible consumption paths is aggregated to a
certainty equivalent.



















(a) ≻ (b) ⇐⇒ EIS > 1/CRRA
(a) ≺ (b) ⇐⇒ EIS < 1/CRRA
is taken from Kocherlakota (1990). An agent with a preference for early resolution of
uncertainty would prefer tree (a) to tree (b): the two trees oﬀer the same distribution
of outcomes at each point in time, but in tree (a) time 2 consumption is revealed
one period earlier. The label “preference for early resolution of uncertainty” seems
to suggest that an agent would like to process any information on the current state
of the economy because it reduces uncertainty about her future consumption. For
the parameters used in the long run risk asset pricing literature, we show that always
processing information is optimal in the sense of being a Nash strategy. However, if
there is a persistent component in the consumption growth rate trend, consumers can
achieve an even higher utility level by committing to not processing information at any
point in the future.
One way to understand our result is by noting that agents with relatively high risk
aversion also dislike a positive correlation between current consumption growth and
expected consumption growth (Piazzesi and Schneider, 2007). One the one hand, the
consumer faces more consumption uncertainty when she relies on the coarser informa-
tion set. On the other hand, relying on the coarser information set also shut down
4any correlation between current and expected future consumption growth rates. In the
simple economy we study, the second eﬀect dominates, so ignorant agents achieve, on
average, a higher utility level.
The paper is structured as follows: section 1 introduces the stylized long run risk
model we use in our analysis. Section 2 analyzes the process of information acquisition
by an agent facing the possibility not to incorporate any type of news about the current
state of the trend consumption growth rate. Section 3 shows that learning the growth
rate of the economy is a Nash strategy, but that ignorance can be supported as an
equilibrium strategy when it yields a higher utility level. Section 4 quantiﬁes the utility
gains from ignorance using standard calibrations from the long run risk asset pricing
literature. Section 5 concludes.
1 A stylized economy with long-run risk
Our laboratory is a simple endowment economy where the growth rate of the log of
the representative agent’s consumption is the sum of an AR(1) component and a white
noise shock. The setup is based on Hansen et al. (2008) and our exposition closely
follow theirs.
1.1 Endowment process
Let ǫt and wt be two series of i.i.d. standard normal innovation terms. Log consumption
follows a random walk plus a time varying drift. The ﬁrst diﬀerence of the drift is given
by
ct+1 − ct =  c + xt+1 + σcǫt+1. (1)
That is, the log consumption growth rate trend at time t is a combination of a
5constant ( c) and a time varying component xt. x follows an AR(1) process given by:
xt+1 = κxt + σxwt+1. (2)
1.2 Preferences
All agents in the economy are ex-ante equal with preferences over consumption paths




1−ρ + βRt (Vt+1)
1−ρ￿ 1
1−ρ (3)
where ρ is equal to the reciprocal of the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution (EIS).
The risk adjustment Rt is also of the constant elasticity of substitution type:







where θ is the Coeﬃcient of Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA). Given the process as-
sumptions above, Vt is homogeneous of degree 1 in the level of consumption. Let vt
denote the logarithm of the continuation value normalized by the consumption level.




log[(1 − β) + β exp[(1 − ρ)Qt(vt+1 + ct+1 − ct)]], (5)




logEt [exp((1 − θ)vt+1)]
We distinguish two main information sets for the consumer: Under the coarser
6information set FI
t , the consumer is endowed with information about all the model
hyper parameters and the current consumption level. The alternative information set
FN
t is a reﬁnement of FI
t where the consumer also knows the current level of the
consumption growth trend xt.3 For analytical tractability, we focus on the case ρ = 1 as
in Tallarini (2000). This assumption, in conjunction with the Gaussian shock processes
we assume, allows for simple closed form solutions for the value function under the two




logE (exp[(1 − θ)(vt+1 + ct+1 − ct)]). (6)
2 Optimal information acquisition
2.1 Alternative value functions
2.1.1 Updating every period (Nash)
We denote the log continuation value when the consumer observes xt and expects to
always learn xt by vN
t . As we will see below, always choosing to acquire information
is a Nash equilibrium in a game that the agent plays against her future selves. In this
case the continuation value from equation (6) is given by
v
N
t =  v + Uvxt, (7)
3The trend growth rate follows a Markov process, so the most recent trend level is a suﬃcient
























The term  v is the unconditional expectation of the scaled log continuation value.
It is given by the discounted present value of the long run consumption growth  c
and a correction for the variance of the consumption growth rate that depends on the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion parameter θ.4 The coeﬃcient Uv gives the discounted
present value of the temporary increase in log-consumption growth induced by a unit
change in the mean reverting trend component xt.
2.1.2 Never updating
We now turn to the agent’s value function if she has no information on the current
level of x and she can commit to never learning anything about x in the future. In the
next section, we show how this can be supported as an equilibrium strategy. When no
information is revealed about x, the only variable in the agent’s information set which
changes over time is the current consumption level Ct. It follows that vt is constant.
We denote its value by vI, where the superscript I reﬂects the relative ignorance of the




(1 − β)(1 − θ)
logE [exp[(1 − θ)(ct+1 − ct]] (9)
Unconditionally, ∆ct+1 ∼ N ( c,σ2
c + σ2
x/(1 − κ2)). Solving for the expectation on
the right hand side of equation (9) gives
4As we will see in Section 4, the long run risk asset pricing literature assumes that θ > 1, so that



















The ﬁrst term in equation (10) is the discounted present sum of future mean growth
rates. The second term in the squared parenthesis of equation (10) is a risk adjustment
which is proportional to unconditional variance of consumption growth rates. With log
utility (θ = 1) this term is zero. When the coeﬃcient of risk aversion is greater than 1
the risk correction lowers the continuation value.
2.1.3 Interpretation
Under the coarser information set, the unconditional and conditional variance of con-
sumption growth rates are equal. For κ ∈ (0,1), this means that the consumer faces
a higher conditional consumption volatility under the coarser information set. By it-
self this will increase the perceived riskiness of the consumption path and gives the
consumer an incentive to choose the ﬁner information set.
Under the ﬁner information set the conditional variance of trend innovations enters
the consumer’s continuation value with the scaling factor 1/(1 − βκ)2. This reﬂects
that any shock wt+1 to the trend growth rate is sticky. A shock wt+1 will increase
consumption growth at t + 1 + n by κnwt+1. Relative to an increase in time t + 1
consumption growth, consumption growth at t + 1 + n is valued at βn. The factor
P∞
n=0 βnκn = 1/(1 − βκ) scales the eﬀect of shocks to trend consumption shocks to
take account for the stickiness of the trend.
Under the coarser information set, the agent eﬀectively ﬁnds herself living in an
economy where consumption growth is a random walk with a drift. In this economy
consumption growth rates are more volatile, which is reﬂected in the scaling factor
1/(1 − κ2) on the conditional variance of the trend growth rate of consumption.
For θ > 1, the consumer proﬁts from the lower conditional variance, but suﬀer from
9the larger impact of innovations to xt+1 on her continuation value.
2.1.4 When does ignorance pay oﬀ?
It is only interesting for the consumer to opt for the coarser information set when her
ex-ante continuation value is higher without information on the trend growth rate. This











Since vI is constant, it is equal to its certainty equivalent (i.e. vI = Q(vI).) vN depends
on the normally distributed trend growth rate, so its certainty equivalent Q(vN) corrects
for the inﬂuence of the trend growth rate through the last term on the right hand side
of the above equation. Figure 2 provides an graphical analysis of the agent’s options:
the shaded area in the ﬁgure gives combinations of β and κ where vI is higher than
Q(vN). That is, it gives parameter combinations for which an agent would prefer to
commit to not learning the trend growth rate. For the high time discount factors used
in the long-run risk literature (see Section 4), the ﬁgure indicates that the agent would
prefer to commit to ignorance regardless of the value of the persistence parameter κ.
3 Implementability
For ignorance to be an equilibrium strategy, we need to show that it is feasible and
individually rational.
10Figure 2: Parameter regions where information lowers utility when θ > 1
The shaded area give parameter values for which there is an expected utility
loss from always learning the trend growth rate compared to the case of
ignorance. The CRRA is ﬁxed to a value of 10.
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without ﬁltering
3.1 Feasibility
Since we are in a complete markets endowment economy, one feasible investment strat-
egy for the consumer is to invest all her wealth in a consumption claim (i.e. invest in a
claim which pays dividends proportional to aggregate consumption) and every period
consume its dividends. Because we are assuming that the preferences of the consumer
are identical to those of the representative agent in the economy, this is the same con-
sumption and portfolio choice she will achieve in equilibrium if she chooses to learn the
trend growth rate every period.
113.2 Individual rationality
Always ﬁltering is a Nash equilibrium
Assume that the agent knows xt−1 and that she expects she will always include the
current value of x in her information set in future periods. Her certainty equivalent if
she chooses to learn xt also this period is
Q(vt | xt−1) = Q[ v + Uvxt | xt−1]












logE (exp[(1 − θ)(vt+1 + ct+1 − ct] | xt−1)








The two expressions diﬀer only in a factor β in the last term. For θ > 1, the right hand
side of equation (12) is strictly lower than the certainty equivalent when the agent learns
the state of the economy given by equation 11. This implies that the agent suﬀers a
utility loss if she deviates by not updating her information on the trend growth rate in
a single period.
Supporting ignorance strategy by threat of Nash
Consider the following strategy for the agent who has no information on the trend
growth rate. As long as she has never learned the state of the economy in the past,
she will never choose to learn it. She promises herself that, should she ever deviate
from this strategy by learning the growth rate trend, she will always keep learning it
in future periods. The threat is credible, since it amounts to playing a Nash strategy.
12Her continuation value conditional on never updating in the future is given by vI.
Her expected scaled continuation value if she deviates is given by
Q[v
N









As long as the preference and process parameters belong to the shaded area in Figure
2, the agent will never choose to deviate, so never learning xt is an equilibrium strategy.
4 Numerical results
In this section we quantify the utility gains that an agent could achieve by committing
to ignorance using two parameterizations taken from successful asset pricing models:
One taken employed by Bansal and Yaron (2004) and one employed by Hansen (2007).
We measure the utility gains from ignorance by solving for the percentage change in
consumption level an agent, who is forced to play the Nash strategy of always learning
the trend growth rate of consumption, would require to make him equally happy ex-ante
as an agent who is allowed to commit to ignorance.
For ρ = 1 the utility gain is computed using the closed form solutions provided in
equations 7 and 10. In particular we subtract from vI the certainty equivalent Q(vN
t ).
For ρ  = 1 we use a Gaussian quadrature with 300 nodes to approximate the law of
motion for the trend growth rate and solve for vt on the nodes of the quadrature. Here
the certainty equivalent is computed by applying the operator Q to the values of vt on
the grid using the ergodic state probabilities implied by the discretized law of motion.
(See Tauchen and Hussey (1991) for a discussion of this method.)
To match asset prices, all the proposed parametrizations share a high level of per-
sistence (κ) for the consumption process. Such high levels of κ generates large utility
gains from committing to ignore the state of the trend growth rate, because it magniﬁes
13Table 1: Utility gains
Reported are the estimated utility gains for agent that is not processing the
available information in the analyzed experimental economy. The ﬁrst column
is based on the calibration introduced by Bansal and Yaron (2004), where the
parameters for the utility function are as following: the CRRA is set to 10, the
EIS is set to 1.5, and the discount factor β is set to 0.998. For this case the gains
are also computed with the closed solution case of EIS = 1. The last column
is calculated with the set of parameters speciﬁed in Hansen (2007) which has a
CRRA of 2 and an EIS set to 1. All reported gains are in percentage points.
Bansal and Yaron (2004) Hansen (2007)
Process parameters:









EIS = 1 42.986
EIS= 1 35.021 12.573
both the eﬀect of the information of the trend growth rate on the conditional variance
of consumption growth and the larger impact of innovations to xt+1 on her continuation
value.
Our quantitative results are reported in Table 1. The ﬁrst column gives the gain
from commiting to ignorance for the calibration used by Bansal and Yaron (2004) which
has an elasticity of intertemporal substitution (1/ρ) of 1.5. Results are striking, with a
43% increase in lifetime consumption obtained by ignoring the trend growth rate. The
last line of the table gives the same ﬁgure in the case the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution is 1.. The utility gains from committing to ignore the information on the
trend growth rate are still sizable at 35 %. The second column of Table 1 gives results
14for the parametrization used by Hansen (2007). He sets the risk aversion parameter to
2 and the elasticity of substitution to 1. By itself, reducing θ from 10 to 2, reduces the
utility gains from committing to ignorance by 88 %, but the higher standard deviation
of innovations to the trend growth rate still produces a utility gain equivalent to a 12
% increase in lifetime consumption from committing to ignorance.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have documented an unknown feature of the family of recursive prefer-
ences known as Epstein-Zin preferences that arise in long-run risk models used heavily
in asset pricing. We have shown that an agent can achieve large utility gains from
committing to ignoring information on the state of the trend growth rate.
The feature we document is surprising as far as the preference parameters used
are known to produce a preference for early resolution of uncertainty. Our model of
the agent’s decision problem as a repeated game against her future selves shows that
such a commitment to ignorance can be implemented and supported as an equilibrium
strategy.
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